Russia, Ukraine, and EGI

Thoughts.

Idiots who don’t understand the ethnic genetic interests (EGI) concept, and who do not understand the difference between descriptive and prescriptive, will use the Russia-Ukraine concept as an excuse to critique EGI. They’ll see these two genetically closely related peoples fighting, with each allied with genetically more distant peoples (Russia with China; Ukraine with Western Europeans [who are of course more closely related to Slavs than the racially different Chinese]) and believe that this somehow invalidates EGI (if anything it is more of a criticism of descriptive genetic similarity theory (GST) than it is of ethnic genetic interests).

And they have made similar arguments with respect to conflicts throughout history, breathlessly stating things like "Germans allied with Japanese against the British,” and then, in a self-satisfied fashion, as it no one has ever considered this point before, smugly proclaim that EGI is “invalidated.” Of course, once again, they don’t understand descriptive vs. prescriptive, and they also don’t understand how the scope of warfare and human conflict has expanded throughout history, being first neighboring tribes fighting, then nation states, then empires and/or alliances of states, and now we are moving more in the direction of a clash of civilizations. Indeed, with respect to the latter point, one could state that Ukraine is a proxy for “the West;” here the conflict is really Russia vs the West, fought indirectly, just like as in the Cold War, conflicts between the USA and the USSR were fought through proxy states rather than directly.

Nation states have various national interests, including geopolitical strategic interests, often based not only on current events, but on issues of history and national identity. These do not always strictly correlate with prescriptive EGI, a descriptive fact that does not invalidate EGI or its prescriptive value. Let’s consider the current conflict, first from the descriptive standpoint and then from the prescriptive. The tragic history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people is to a large extent directly and indirectly due to Ukraine’s association with Russia.  It is therefore not surprising to observe the reality of a historical tension between closely related Russians and Ukrainians, even though much of the suffering of Ukrainians has been due to Jews and not ethnic Russians (but, still, even then, the problems were mediated through Russia/USSR). Poland also has had an unpleasant history with Russia.  Indeed, Ukrainian and Polish identity is to a large extent associated with hostility to Russia or, if not hostility, then it is defined as being distinct from Russia and Russians (hence, we can see why Putin’s formula of trying to equate Ukraine as an integral part of Russia would be rejected by ethnic Ukrainians as an existential attack on their national identity).  This all being so, it is therefore not surprising that genetically closely related groups like Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles had, and still have, serious conflicts.  After all, we interact with our neighbors more than with those far away, and we typically interact with our family most of all, and with all of these close interactions comes the possibility of competition and conflict.  Aren’t family feuds common, despite blood relations and the adaptive interest we have in the well-being of family? If strong proximate concerns can turn family members against each other, even if it may not be in their strict adaptive interest (unless closer family is set against more distant family), then we cannot be surprised that something similar may occur at the ethny level. In neither case does the descriptive reality delegitimize the prescriptive truth of adaptive interests.

Conversely, Slavic groups like Bulgarians and Serbs, South Slav groups, are genetically more distant from Russians than are Poles and Ukrainians, but because of historical reasons, these more distant groups are typically better disposed toward Russia and Russians than are the groups more genetically similar. These are descriptive realities. So, proximate interests can push groups apart or pull them closer together. Of course, in the global context, there isn’t much of a difference between all of these groups; nevertheless, the pattern still exists.

Also, genetic similarity is not identity, and even with kinship overlap between closely related groups (some members of one group may be actually a bit more closely related to some members of the other group, complicating genetic interests), one can still argue that each national group has its own genetic interests, so if a conflict is geographically focused on neighbors, then conflict between those neighbors is not necessarily incompatible with even a prescriptive view of EGI. So, just like family conflict can be adaptive if one defends the interests of closer kin against those more distant, so can conflict between closely related peoples be adaptive, if the net result of the conflict supports the interests of those with the highest concentration of genetic interest. That said, from the view of long term EGI stability in a global context, amity between closely related ethnies is generally preferable, particularly with the possibility of kinship overlap. We’ll consider prescriptive below but first we will summarize the descriptive.

There are a number of reasons why descriptive reality may not correlate with strict prescriptive EGI. The players may not have an understanding of their genetic interests or understand what their genetic interests are in a particular case. They may not care even if they do know (Salter in On Genetics Interests notes that a “who cares” attitude toward adaptive interests, as an expression of values, may not be objectively answerable [other than to state that people who display such an attitude may eventually be replaced by those who do care about adaptive interests and act accordingly]). It may well be that net genetic interests, at least in the short term, are served by focusing on narrow concentrations of genetic interest even at the cost of more general and dilute interests (this is usually not a sound long term approach, and often backfires even in the short term – see the two world wars, for example).  It may be that history, culture, national identity and other strong proximate interests (that can overlap with EGI) may affect national policy and the actions of a people so strongly that they may pursue “national interests” that run contrary to EGI; the same holds for geopolitical considerations that may seem sound but can be maladaptive in the long run.  Going back to national identity, a fictive civic nationalist identity can certainly harm genetic interests, if one values the interests of a genetically alien co-citizen, and/or a nation full of such alien “fellow citizens," over that of the interests of those genetically closer. Religion, which can cut across genetic lines, fits into the cultural and identity explanations. Certainly, in general, people tend to have more frequent conflicts with their neighbors and, particularly in looking at conflicts in the pre-globalist age, it was infrequent to have conflicts with those on the other side of the globe (although we have been moving in that direction as the “world as gotten smaller”). This is not meant to be a fully comprehensive list, but you get the idea why actual reality may not always fit adaptive prescriptions.

I would like to point out even if you want to look at the current conflict in terms of GST, (not my purpose here), rather than EGI, you can say that the more warm welcome of Ukrainian refugees into European nations compared to that of Colored aliens, is indicative of GST. The idea that the Russians didn’t want into the Ukraine at full force, at least at first, so as to not alienate the native population, but may have been a bit due to GST, but also general “hearts and minds” objectives as well as to display restraint to the international community.

What would be the EGI prescription in the current conflict? It is more or less obvious and accords with what some White nationalists, particularly those without a strong emotional attachment to either side, have suggested. The quicker the conflict ends, the better. National boundaries should follow ethnic boundaries and this can apply even with closely related groups, particularly when the groups have had a difficult history (Russians vs. Ukrainians, Serbs vs Croats, etc.). Closely related groups should try and maintain friendly relations, resolve problems without armed conflict, and try to avoid situations in which they are forced into alliances with the genetically distant against their ethnic close kin.  They should respect each other’s sovereignty. They should engage in fruitful trade and other expressions of amiability, and assist each other to the extent possible (without compromising national interests). It would be helpful if their nations were as homogeneous as possible, and it would be best to avoid having influential minorities who have interests that can lead to conflict between closely related nations. The leadership cadres of nations should come from the majority population and serve majority interests, and these leaders need to have an understanding of biopolitics, including the adaptive interests of EGI. From a prescriptive EGI standpoint, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a maladaptive event and a tragedy. 

The conflict needs to end. Ukraine should maintain its independence, but should cede majority Russian areas to Russia. Alternatively, those ethnic Russians can assimilated (since they are genetically close to the Ukrainian majority) or, if assimilation is not possible for various reasons (including history and culture) then they can be repatriated to Russia. Ukraine should have ethnic Ukrainian leadership, certainly not Jewish leadership, and the nation should not be a pawn in Russian-Western conflicts. Russia needs to understand that the existential threat to is genetic existence (culture and politics are other issues of course) comes from the South and East, not the West, and there needs to be an understanding nor only between Russia and Ukraine but between Russia and the West as well. I’m not saying any of that is likely (descriptive), but that is what should occur (prescriptive).