Ultimate Salter to Proximate Yockey

Up close and proximate, redux.

I have long been interested in melding the work of Salter on ethnic genetic interests – genetic interests being ultimate interests – with the ideas of Yockey, which, with its focus on High Culture, can be viewed as more proximate (issues other than [purely] genetic interests).  For example, see this.

The relationship between ultimate and proximate interests can therefore inform approaches concerning the merger of the Salterian and Yockeyian paradigms. In my analysis of Salterian ethics, I endorsed Salter's mixed adaptive utilitarianism (MAU):

Finally, while the MAU puts limits on the degree to which genetic interests can be pursued, people and ethnies must still have the freedom to advance (not merely defend) their interests within reasonable bounds…That this can be done via the MAU has been argued in Salter’s book and also in my comments above; I would promote a rather aggressive version of the MAU, but one that still incorporates limits and which respects certain proximate interests…in my case, I would value society-wide proximate interests, such as Yockey’s call to actualize a High Culture, over mere individual rights…

Note the mention of Yockeyism there. Thus, a prudent MUA, even one that is aggressive, is compatible with broad proximate interests, such as Yockey’s Imperium idea that is based on High Culture. Of course, there is a strong association between ultimate and proximate interests in this case. After all, a Yockeyian Imperium could safeguard the interests, including the ethnic genetic interests, of the constituent European ethnies constituting that Imperium. On the other hand, a focus on ultimate interests can lead to Yockey’s (proximate) Imperium, with the explanation for that stated above. In the last analysis, the reason that the various European ethnies belong to the same High Culture is their membership in the same continental race, hence the fact that those ethnies have related racial ancestries (genetic kinship leading to overlapping ultimate interests). It is therefore difficult to untangle ultimate from proximate interests in this case.  And that entanglement is important for what follows in my analysis.

The last parts of the last section of Salter’s book, the section on ethics, are crucially important in this regard. Salter considers whether it is ethical for the pursuit of ultimate interests to frustrate the proximate interests of others. In those cases where the distinction between ultimate and proximate interests is very clear cut, Salter concludes that it is ethical to prioritize the ultimate over the proximate, it is appropriate to frustrate some proximate interests in favor of ultimate interests, although he also stresses that genetic competition, and the freedom to conduct that competition, should be allowed.

However, as Salter notes, it is often difficult to clearly distinguish what are ultimate interests from proximate interests, and this is particularly true in those cases where the pursuit of ultimate interests is conducted through the pursuit of proximate interests - i.e., proximate interests advance ultimate interests.  Indeed, this is more often the case than not. Thinking about approaches to enhance ultimate interests, we can consider that those approaches typically involve promoting proximate concerns about things such as wealth, status, various other resources, etc. Thus, given all of these considerations, Salter concludes that in such cases, it may be fair to prioritize proximate interests over ultimate interests (after all, again, the line between the two is often blurry). Salter states that this would conflate with a support for individual rights. Now, I wouldn’t go as far as Salter here, but would modify the statement to conclude:

In those cases where proximate interests can be reasonably seen as supporting ultimate interests, it can be appropriate and ethical to privilege those proximate interests over a set of lesser, non-existential ultimate interests.

Putting it another way, proximate interests that support and advance higher-level ultimate interests should be prioritized over lower-level ultimate interests that may conflict with those proximate interests.

This applies to the Salter-Yockey axis thus:

• The Yockeyian High Culture Imperium is a proximate interest that may (from the ethnonationalist perspective) conflict with claims of ultimate interests from “petty nationalist” ethnonationalists who insist on maintaining exclusive smaller state entities of more concentrated genetic interests.
• However, proximate Yockeyian interests are not clearly distinguished from ultimate interests, since the pursuit of Yockeyian ideals can advance a broader, higher-level, set of ultimate interests – the ethnic genetic interests of Europeans as a whole.
• Pursuing European-wide genetic interests against those of competing racial-civilizational blocs also protects the genetic interests of the narrower national ethnies that constitute the broad European peoples – narrower ethnies that by themselves would be unable to effectively compete with those other racial-civilizational blocs.
• Thus, the proximate interests of Yockeyism could, and in my opinion, should be privileged over the alleged ultimate interests of petty nationalists who favor smaller and more exclusive concentrations of genetic interests, and thus it is appropriate and ethical for Yockeyian proximate interests to frustrate ethnonationalist ultimate interests.

As an addendum to that argument, I state that it is possible to pursue a Yockeyian solution without necessarily damaging the narrower interests of individual European ethnies; the Yockeyian solution does not need to entail panmixia or any other real damage to smaller concentrations of genetic interests.  Indeed, those small concentrations may end up being better preserved, in the long run, by the Yockeyian solution.  On the other hand, a relentless pursuit of petty nationalism would make the Yockeyian solution of Imperium untenable, endangering all Europeans. Thus, not only is the ethnonationalist claim to their narrow genetic interests not existential – their ultimate interests can still exist within the Yockeyian framework – but one can argue that long-term genetic continuity is best assured by being part of a larger power bloc.

Thus, it is ethical to frustrate non-existential petty nationalist ultimate interests in favor of Yockeyian proximate interests that have as their net result advancing both the broader and the narrower sets of genetic interests.

The Salter-Yockey tension of ultimate vs. proximate interests is therefore dissipated and a more coherent whole emerges.  Critics may claim that this coherence is contingent on certain caveats (such as a commitment to preserve smaller-scale ethnic particularisms), but this is the case for every biopolitical scenario, including those promoted by those same critics.

Salter follows the ultimate vs. proximate question with the issue of competing ultimate interests.  Of note is the section on how competing ultimate interests relate to kinship overlap. When the competing ethnies are closely related, then the competition should conflate to cooperation. In those cases where ethnies are closely related, with significant kinship overlap, such as members of the same continental race, then “mutually beneficial strategies” are optimal. I agree, and I suggest that the Yockeyian solution – a Western Imperium based on High Culture – is one such strategy, a strategy that I advocate.

Note that Salter’s concern with “bounded rationality” is related to this; thus, I summarized:

Salter notes that “bounded rationality” – our inability to ever know everything necessary about a problem or issue – is a good reason not to advocate for the pure ethic of unbridled pursuit of genetic interests…dividing a larger nation into smaller micro-states of more concentrated kinship may be seen as maximizing EGI, but if this division weakens the ability of the populations involved to defend their interests against aggressors (or achieve some other beneficial goal that requires a certain size threshold), then net adaptive interests would suffer. Maximizing EGI, trying to squeeze every last drop of genetic interest from a situation, may backfire. In addition, the possibility of kinship overlap between populations is another reason not to be too radical in the pursuit of EGI, particularly within continents, since some people on “their side” may be more genetically similar to you than those on “your side”…The bounded rationality problem, coupled to the possibility of kinship overlap, therefore suggests that a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of EGI is optimal, since errors in interpreting kinship and the best methods for pursuing adaptiveness may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests…

Given kinship overlap between Europeans, the extreme ethnonationalism championed by the petty nationalists "may result in serious, perhaps irreversible, damage to adaptive interests." Of course, one can question whether these petty nationalists have any rationality at all, forget about "bounded rationality." This also relates to my distinction between a pursuit of “gross genetic interests” – attempting to maximize genetic interests without consideration of costs and benefits and what the ultimate outcomes are – and “net genetic interests” – pursuit of optimizing benefits vs. costs with respect to genetic interests so as to provide the best final outcome when all factors are properly considered.

Note that in On Genetic Interests, at different parts of the book, Salter advocates for smaller states and also for larger civilizational blocs, so advocates of each approach can find quotes supporting each of those alternatives. My analysis is of course my own; Salter himself may agree or disagree with my views on this issue, I do not know.

There are some other quotes in On Genetic Interests of relevance here. Thus:

But in the modern context individuals are defenceless unless they participate in powerful group strategies, foremost being the state.

That could be re-written (also with American spelling) as:

But in the globalist context individual ethnies are defenseless unless they participate in powerful group strategies, foremost being the Imperium.

Also, see this: 

There are profound ethical implications in making the state simultaneously the champion of a nation's interests in the international scene and a disinterested arbitrator of family interests within the nation.

Re-writing:

There are profound ethical implications in making the Imperium simultaneously the champion of a civilizational bloc's interests in the international scene and a disinterested arbitrator of national interests within the Imperium.

So, on a larger scale, what applies to an individual nation protecting genetic interests can also apply to the Imperium.  This included being an arbiter of competing national interests within the Imperium, although, remember, given kinship overlap, that internal competition should be muted, particularly compared to competition between more genetically divergent civilizational blocs. That is, again, my view; I do not speak for Salter.

In summary, I believe that the Salterian and Yockeyian perspectives are compatible, particularly when one considers the ethics of balancing ultimate and proximate interests. Hence, Imperium can support the ultimate interests of all persons of European descent worldwide.