The Risks of Risk Aversion

Managing risk.

See this.

See this on the harm of risk aversion to society.  Covid has demonstrated examples of the risk aversion of both the Left and the Right.  With respect to the Left:

Instead of relying on insurance to mitigate the consequences of risk, Americans have opted to seek the elimination of risk, to insulate ourselves as much as possible from exposure to danger. Hence the hesitancy of blue states to ease up on public-health restrictions surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, even with vaccination rates in those parts of the country running quite high. Many public schools and private universities combine mask mandates with vaccine mandates, even though the latter renders the former almost entirely superfluous.

Covid has been a real problem and not a “hoax” but there has been an over-reaction and the over-reaction to the crisis has more to do with extreme risk aversion, and the desire for absolute safety, than it does some dastardly globalist conspiracy for to “take away our freedom” (as if you actually still have “freedom” in today’s multicultural Far-Left America).  This is the same weak and soft desire to avoid all harm and all unpleasantness that informs leftist craziness about “safe spaces” and “microagressions.” The idea that life constitutes a degree of risk is anathema to such people.  Under these circumstances, America could not have put men on the moon. Even in the unlikely event that the space program got as far as Apollo, after the Apollo 1 tragedy, the entire program would have been shut down. Risk!  People died!  But again, I doubt that we would have even got through the Mercury and Gemini programs with today’s risk aversion. The Mercury program?  Blasting people into space with the Redstone MRBM or the Atlas ICBM?  The Gemini program? Using the Titan II ICBM?  That never would happen today. With today's attitude of risk aversion, those early programs would have necessitated the development of brand new rockets, each with a decade of 100% successful testing before the System would even think of using one on a person. 

But is the Right any better?

The most vaccine-hesitant parts of the country might seem more willing to accept risk, but that is deceptive. What is the rejection of a vaccine if not a refusal to accept the risk of trying it? Anti-vaxxers are only more willing than other Americans to live with the risk of catching COVID because they foolishly believe it's riskier to take one of the vaccines.

Quite right, and I have commented on this previously. The Right likes to pretend that the unvaccinated are the brave and the vaccinated are mewling cowards but with respect to the vaccine the opposite is more true. Hysteria about the covid vaccination (and anti-vaxxism in general) is an example of extreme risk aversion. It is an attempt to avoid a very small risk derived from something that is a known, concrete, scheduled event (i.e., getting a vaccine), while gambling that a potential unscheduled danger, such as contracting covid and getting a severe case of that disease, won’t happen. True, there is risk aversion on both sides, but the unhealthy risk aversion is on the side of the unvaccinated, since their desire to eliminate all risk due to a vaccine leaves the open to a greater risk from the disease.  Getting the vaccine is a calculated risk (see below), while leaving oneself unprotected to a disease is more of a reckless risk (also see below). One can actually consider getting the vaccine more of risk mitigation (see below) than risk aversion.

Thus, risk aversion is the flipside of recklessness; an inappropriate attempt of avoidance of virtually all risk leads to lost opportunities and, paradoxically, can actually increase risk since avoidance of small risk from a definitive known (e.g., getting a vaccination) can set one up for a much greater risk from a potential possibility (e.g., getting the disease targeted by the vaccination).

Extreme risk aversion is therefore a net negative for individuals, groups, and society as a whole.  It is also a net negative for any movement (political, social, etc.) as well. Some may argue that my criticism of risk aversion is not consistent with my previous criticism and condemnation of the “movement” for engaging in extremely risky behavior, such as Unite the Right, etc. However. one must carefully make a distinction between recklessly risky behavior, which I condemn, and taking calculated risks, accompanied by careful planning including contingency planning, which, in certain circumstances, is worth the risk involved. 

Of course, the calculations required for a “calculated risk” must take into account many variables, including, for example, the relative strengths and weaknesses of all involved.  In general, the Far Right is much weaker, much more vulnerable, than its opponents, including the System. In this sense, I agree that risk mitigation (minimizing unnecessary risk to the extent possible and/or preparing contingency plans if things go wrong) is important (*).  An error that can be survived by the System would likely prove fatal for the Far Right.  In this sense, there is less room for maneuver for the Far Right.  But this is not the whole story,

The Far Right has some advantages; sometimes the weaker opponent, the dissident force, can leverage particular characteristics of the unequal struggle to its advantage. Any victory by the weaker side, being unexpected, is amplified (in the same way the effects of a loss are amplified in the sense that it could put the very existence of the weaker entity into question). The stronger opponent is expected to win; indeed, the mere continued survival of a weaker opponent is itself a victory and delegitimizes the stronger opponent (*). Thus, the morale gained by victory is relatively greater for the weaker side; conversely, the loss of morale of a defeat is greater for the stronger side since they are expected to win and thus unexpected defeats sting all the more.  In addition, when the stronger side is in power, as is the System, it has greater responsibilities, must placate a wider range of interests, and has many areas that can be targeted.  It is difficult to protect all potential targets equally; there are always exposed flanks. While the System would seem to have more room to maneuver, the extreme risk aversion of today’s American society is a major weakness for the System, in fact hampering to some extent its freedom of action.  If an entity is so afraid of risk, so afraid of loss, so careful in all it does, it is unlikely to be able to endure what is ultimately necessary for final victory.

As long as the weaker dissident forces practices risk mitigation and not risk aversion it can take advantage of opportunities without engaging in self-destructive recklessness. On the other hand, when the stronger entity is beset with extreme risk aversion, as is the System, particularly in America, then it becomes increasingly vulnerable, since it cares more about avoiding defeat than in achieving victory.  But the stronger party, unlike the weaker (*), cannot achieve a strategic victory merely by avoiding defeat. The stronger entity is expected to win and its failure to achieve a clear cut actual victory delegitimizes its existence and is a strategic defeat. If extreme risk aversion prevents the stronger entity from doing what is necessary to achieve that clear cut victory then its strategic defeat is likely.

Note:

*In an unequal struggle, such as, for example, the American Revolution, the weaker entity must ensure its survival at all costs. Thus, the Continental Army, under the wise guidance of George Washington, did not engage in existential “all or nothing” battles against the superior British forces. On the other hand, calculated risks were taken and the Americans did engage the British at times, sometimes with success, sometimes with failure, but in every case, a paramount strategic objective was the continued existence of the American forces. In such an unequal struggle, for the weaker side sometimes not losing becomes the strategic equivalent of winning. Indeed, the Americans won the Revolutionary War (with French help of course) despite British military superiority; the Americans outlasted the British. Note that, as suggested above, the “not losing” strategy can work for the weaker party, but not for the stronger one. The stronger entity is expected to win and must win a clear cut victory, destroying its opponents, in order to achieve a strategic victory.  All else leads, eventually and ultimately, to strategic defeat.