The Homosexual Question, Part I

Delving into a subject usually not discussed at this blog.

My general attitude toward homosexuality in the “movement” has been one of “live and let live” – not considering it a major issue or concern, as long as people were discreet. Perhaps I should have known better given some of my experiences back in the early days of Yahoo discussion groups.  I was aware of one homosexual WN group forming and I thought, well, if they want to do their own thing, but are sincere activists and concentrate on promoting White interests, fine.  Then one day I decided to go and read the posts at the group (at that time freely accessible to non-members) to better determine what was going on there. I found it to be a disgusting cesspool of campy Nazi play-acting, “leather Nazis” engaging in S and M, advertising sex acts to each other (“U piss, I drink”), etc.  I was, honestly, completely disgusted and at that time thought Pierce showed wisdom banning homosexuals from being members of the National Alliance.  Several years later, Salter’s On Genetic Interests came out, and that book, which had a profound influence on me, had a short section on homosexuals, essentially promoting a tolerant line - homosexuals actually should have even more invested in ethny (and of course extended family) since most have no children of their own, and has long as homosexuals support EGI, ethnic-based natalism, and traditional family formation then they should expect toleration of their sexual expression. So, one could (naively) think of the Yahoo experience as an aberration, and hope that the On Genetic Interests paradigm could serve as a way of going forward.

However, two other things occurred at around the same time, the early 2000s, of relevance. First, a (heterosexual) person of some importance in the “movement” at that time  – and who shall remain nameless here - warned me about a “homosexual clique” that had seriously undermined him. Somewhat later, another activist of long-standing informed me that a prominent “movement” personage – a “Mr. X” as we’ll refer to him here – was a homosexual, although one “in the closet” as Mr. X had made an effort to hide his inclinations (if the accusation was true).  Although I never heard anything else ever again about Mr. X in this regard, certain more recent incidents suggest to me that the accusation may have been correct, and that Mr. X may be involved, at least peripherally, in the aforementioned clique. These are obviously issues of concern – homosexual cliques undermining straight activists to replace those activists with homosexual counterparts, august personages “in the closet” with who knows what hidden agenda, etc. But, truth be told, I didn’t think much of it at the time.  My focus was solely on race and my own ideas and I didn’t care too much about what I perceived as peripheral issues.  And, after all, perhaps some of these accusations were mistaken, I thought at the time, or, irrelevant to the “movement” as a whole.  That was, of course, short-sighted on my part.

To further analyze this subject, let’s look at a more recent Salter essay.

A remarkable feature of the same-sex marriage movement, that has helped make it a juggernaut, is the solidarity of its disparate parts. Lesbian activists don’t mock gays before the general public, gay activists don’t ridicule bisexuals, bisexuals don’t disrespect the transgendered, and so on, presumably down the growing list of non-traditional sexual and gender orientations.

As an example of a pro-gay marriage piece from the “movement,” see this.  My riposte is here.  Note that while I oppose the main theme of that piece equating non-reproductive heterosexual relations with homosexuality, I take a generally tolerant position about homosexuality, a subject that I claimed at the time I had little interest in.  Thus I wrote:

I also agree that when considering homosexuality (a subject that in general I have little interest in), a “give and take” attitude can be constructive.  A degree of tolerance can be given to gays, in exchange for them to stop allying with the Left to wreck race and civilization, and an admission from their part that they are abnormal, analogous to a disability.  For example, I don’t hate people who are deaf, but if they attempt to declare deafness as normal, desirable, the same as hearing, if they also declare a “deaf culture” (and some do) and refuse treatments for themselves and (especially) their children (if deaf as well), then I do have a problem. The same goes for the blind, and also considers that accommodation can only go so far: we cannot have blind brain surgeons, taxi drivers, or airplane pilots, regardless of how “unfair” that is. Homosexuals need to accommodate the needs of the larger society in exchange for tolerance. They are abnormal regardless of how one wants to define that – either based on frequency or biological fitness.  But if they defend their family and ethnic genetic interests, that is all to the good. One can argue that homosexuals (and anyone who does not personally reproduce) have a relatively greater interest in their race’s genetic continuity (as well as that of their family), because that is all they have to work with to improve their inclusive fitness.  They also need to understand that many heterosexuals find the idea of homosexual relations repugnant and would – especially if they value genetic continuity – be greatly displeased if their children were homosexual and did not find some way to reproduce (as opposed to adopt). Of course, childlessness of heterosexual children would have the same negative effect on their parents' fitness, but without the aesthetic disgust toward homosexual acts.

Having said all of that, better a homosexual racist than a heterosexual liberal.  Better gay than a race mixer.  I’ll take Ernst Rohm as a comrade over John Derbyshire any day.

Obviously, I'm now questioning that nonchalant attitude and will now examine Salter’s arguments.

That is odd because some categories, to be discussed, are noticeably absent from that list. Possible reasons for excluding them include the law, aesthetics, and morality. Legality can be immediately ruled out. Homosexuality’s illegality until recently has not prevented agitation for gay rights. Aesthetics can also be ruled out, because LGBTQI-rights activists have been pushing back against popular revulsion for decades. If they cited legality or aesthetics to justify excluding selected types of sexuality, consistency would demand immediate cessation of their own activities. No sexual or gender category can be credibly excluded from the LGBTQI fold for legal or aesthetic reasons.

Note that last sentence.  Salter makes the argument that the LGBTQI crowd has no legal or aesthetic rationale to exclude even the most horrific perversions from the fold – incest, bestiality, pedophilia (which some of them openly embrace), etc.

Morality is different. Morality is the only conceivable principled reason that some sexualities are excluded from the fold. Whether or not one accepts the morality of the alternative sexuality and gender movement, there are nevertheless some ethical principles associated with it. These include the rights to free expression and association. It is asserted that gender and sexual expression should be unconstrained when harmless and when entered into by mutual consent.

Free association?  Can gays be legally excluded from society?  Or must we bake wedding cakes for them?

These principles are sufficient to explain the exclusion of pedophilia from the LGBTQI platform. It seems the great majority of individuals of all orientations reject it. 

Well, “great majority” isn’t all. Interesting that most (all?) pedophiles among Catholic priests are molesting boys and not girls.  Coincidence?

Mary De Young has documented attempts by paedophile activists to normalize sex between adults and children from at least the 1980s in “The indignant page: Techniques of neutralization in the publications of pedophile organizations” (Child Abuse & Neglect, 1988).[i] A more recent study by O’Halloran and Quayle in “A content analysis of a ‘boy love’ support forum: Revisiting Durkin and Bryant” found that the trend has remained uninterrupted (Journal of Sexual Aggression, 2010). These attempts have failed to convince many people that children are able to give informed, prudent consent to sexual contact. It is true that educational packages such as the Safe Schools program sexualise children but that is not the same thing as advocating the legalization of paedophilia.

The fact is that some of these types have been trying to normalize pedophilia.

LGBTQI morality is not a credible reason for excluding all of the sexualities missing from that acronym. Consider polygamy, often called plural marriage. This was opposed by the Medieval Church and before that the Romans and Ancient Greeks, making Europe the only monogamous stratified society until the modern era.[ii] The law that enforces monogamy necessarily restricts the free choices of adults to participate in consensual polygamous relationship. If polygamy does not contravene LGBTQI moral principles, why is there not a ‘P’ in ‘LGBTQI? As Brendon Wynter noted recently on our public broadcaster (ABC Religion & Ethics, 24 March 2017) attempts to find a moral distinction between plural and same-sex marriage can lead to illiberal claims, such as that polygamy but not homosexual marriage is “bad or at least, trivial”.[iii]

A ‘P’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Very well.

Incest is also missing from the LGBTQI heading. From an LGBTQI moral perspective, why ban sex or marriage between any consenting adults? As the actor Jeremy Irons commented a few years ago, genetic disorders in the children of incestuous unions are only an issue with heterosexual pairs.[iv] LGBTQI advocates are not in a position to complain about incest on the basis of its being gay or lesbian. From their perspective, love and lust between consenting adults should never be condemned.

That last sentence follows from the gay agenda and can and will eventually lead to all sorts of grotesqueries – situations incompatible with the sort of healthy racialist state most WNs envision.

On what grounds could LGBTQI advocates object to marriages between mother and daughter or father and son, or object to them adopting? One ground that has been raised is a supposed categorical difference between those sexually attracted to close kin and those sexually attracted to members of the same sex. The former, it is claimed, do not belong to a distinct class of individuals but the latter do.[v] In the case of same-sex attraction, it is proposed, accurately, that homosexual orientation is sometimes inborn, and that as a result these individuals cannot change their same-sex attraction. Preventing them from marrying the same sex is therefore discriminatory. Incest is held to be different on the basis of the claim that it is a matter of free choice. For that reason, banning incestuous marriage does not constitute discrimination, and is therefore consistent with liberal ethics. This argument breaks down with the second premise, that incestuous desire is not inborn. The Finnish sociologist Edward Westermarck discovered that incest avoidance is a universal inborn trait that is triggered by close proximity during childhood. De Smet, van Speybroeck and Verplaetse investigated this theory in Evolution and Human Behavior (2014) and found that children raised together are usually averse to sexual contact during and after puberty.[vi] It follows that sexual desire for a sibling or offspring is in part or whole due to genetically-programmed developmental processes. The fact that incestuous motivation is produced when these processes go awry does not make them any less inborn. Thus incestuous motivation is not always a matter of free choice and in such cases, according to LGBTQI ethics, it is a right when consensual and harmless.

An ‘I’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Thus, according to Salter’s argument, the homosexual agenda has an ethical underpinning that would justify incest.

Bestiality also presents difficulties for the brevity of ‘LGBTQI’. On which grounds can advocates condemn sex with animals? As already noted, legal and aesthetic distinctions are unavailable. The rule against cruelty is also unavailable most of the time. Cruelty is wrong, and sex with animals can be cruel but so can sex with humans. The fact that animals cannot consent is not relevant because they do not, as a rule, possess human rights. In Australia and many other countries animals are protected against cruel treatment, but that does not include protection against being killed and eaten. Apart from militant vegetarians and vegans, most feel justified eating animals, so it is not obvious why, without invoking traditional moral or aesthetic standards, sexual contact that does not inflict suffering can be considered immoral.

The bestiality category is not an empty hypothetical. A recent academic study by Earls and Lalumiere titled “A case study of preferential bestiality”, published in the journal Archives of Sexual Behavior (2009), indicates that it is not as rare as previously thought, and shares many of the characteristics of other atypical sexual interests.[vii] Likewise, a recent report in the Australian online edition of The Guardian by Mona Chalabi, “Bestiality: which animals are most at risk” (22 June 2017), describes the online zoosexual movement that advocates the rights of the bestially inclined.[viii] The most preferred species appear to be dogs and cows, but cases are reported involving horses and even snakes. Woody Allen might add sheep.[ix]

There is a human dimension to the issue. Members of what we might reluctantly call the zoosexual community feel they are treated unfairly by the mainstream, which includes the LGBTQI movement. Some feel trapped in human relationships, such as the man who felt that sex with his (human) wife was “wrong” and during marital acts closed his eyes to better pretend she was a horse. Earlier this year an article in The Independent reported that animal sex tourism became such a problem in Denmark that in 2016 the country criminalized bestiality.[x] The journalist hinted that bestiality usually conforms to the harm principle: “[T]he studies published over the last 15 years using non-clinical samples report the vast majority of zoophiles do not appear to be suffering any significant clinical[ly] significant distress or impairment as a consequence of their behavior.”

Surely most LGBTQI people will share the generally-held opinion of bestiality. Many will be disgusted by the very thought and wish it never to be depicted or praised in public. They will wish that it never be part of their social environment and certainly not that of any child’s.

However, if LGBTQI activists believe the position they urge on the public, consistency demands they not only tolerate bestiality but treat it as possessing equal rights to human-centric sex. Otherwise they are guilty of the illiberal prejudice of claiming that their kind of love is superior to others they deem deviant. And if even the proponents of LGBTQI rights were to admit the legitimacy of privileging one sexual or gender orientation over another, then their main defence against hetero-normativity would collapse.

An extra ‘B’ should also be added to the acronym.

Thus, according to Salter’s argument, the homosexual agenda has an ethical underpinning that would justify bestiality.

Other initials could be added. Why not an ‘R’ for love of robots and dolls? Blow up dolls and simple silicone mannequins with recorded voices are primitive compared to the pleasure model “replicants” depicted in the science fiction classic Blade Runner. Nevertheless, they are beginning to compete for men’s affections.[xi] This is a rapidly growing industry feeding insatiable demand. The Third International Congress on Love and Sex with Robots is to be held in London in December 2017.[xii] Professor Noel Sharkey, chairman of the Foundation for Responsible Robotics, points to guilt-free threesomes as a potential use of sex robots.[xiii] He and colleagues predict that many humans will have sexual relationships with robots. Evidence is already emerging of men feeling embarrassed about seeking sex and companionship from artificial women.[xiv] Women might also suffer embarrassment when robot gigolos become feasible. From the perspective of LGBTQI morality it is wrong to shun or mock people just because they are turned on by machines.

An ‘R’ should be added to ‘LGBTQI’.

Gays should therefore welcome their new robotic sexual overlords.

One suspects that pragmatism is a big reason why LGBTQI activists want to keep polygamy, incest, bestiality and sex robots in the closet. Activists do not want to openly associate with these categories because that would increase opposition. The public might wonder about the implications. If exotic gender identities and same-sex marriage are to be taught in schools as equal to the heterosexual types, why not polygamy, incest, bestiality, and sex dolls? Citizens would be more likely to resist demands for full legal equality until the slippery slope were shown to have principled limits.

LGBTQI campaigns assert that love is equal, yet they help marginalize attachments and acts they find repugnant or inconvenient. The activist community should acknowledge all types of sexuality and marriage that meet their professed moral standard. They should not deceive the public by selectively applying their morality.

Here, Salter is essentially accusing the LGBTQI community of hypocrisy and cherry-picked moral standards. This is not necessarily a problem for LGBTQI White activists, unless they openly promote some or all of the LGBTQI agenda.

Alternatively, activists should abandon their artificial solidarity and the morality they deploy to justify it. They should admit that not all sexual desire and acts and types of marriage are equal. Many will join with the straight binary community in rejecting the appropriateness of polygamy, incest and bestiality. In so doing they might view their own orientation with humility and ponder whether insisting on complete normalisation is good for society.

That includes attempts to normalize this agenda within the confines of White racial nationalism; people who prioritize the interests of their sexual preferences over the good of the race, and who use pro-White activism as a vehicle to promote a particular sexual agenda.  To actually use racialist meetings as homosexual pick-up opportunities, with same-sex sexual harassment, is obviously completely unacceptable. There shouldn’t even be heterosexual activity of that nature at meetings, that is unprofessional and uncalled for, but at least such activity would be consistent with the majority’s normal and reproductively sound healthy sexual preferences.  To promote abnormal sexuality at meetings, to defend it, laugh it off, and/or minimize it in any way, is beyond the pale.

Until LGBTQI activists admit the radical implications of their morality, the spelling of ‘GBTQI’ and its variations should be contested. Rearranging the extra letters discussed, consistency demands an extra ‘B’, ‘I’, ‘R’ and ‘P’ (at least). In addition, the rainbow flag deserves a jarring additional stripe standing for the arbitrarily excluded categories as well as the hypocrisy of LGBTQI activists. Such as honest inclusive symbol would also serve to inform the public of where the arguments of the radical sexuality and gender movement logically lead.

Once again, Salter labels members of the gay movement as hypocrites who arbitrarily draw lines for acceptability to include their own preferences, but excluding those of others who, by LGBTQI ethics and logic, should have the same fundamental rights.  

Let us add ‘BIRP’ to ‘LGBTQI’ until activists apply their arguments consistently. When they do, they also will adopt the extra letters and perhaps some other besides.

“Others besides.”  The mind boggles.

So, at this point, what do we have?  It depends if you accept the legitimacy of Salter’s arguments. I essentially do so accept them and all they imply about the ethics of the hmosexual agenda, which is of course directly relevant to the issue of homosexuality in the "movement."  Is this essay by Salter necessarily incompatible with what he previously wrote in On Genetic Interests? I do not believe it is, although it may be an evolution in thinking, based on various factors, including perhaps the increased “in your face” militancy of gay activists. The compatibility between the two works would be if one accepts a baseline of tolerance for homosexuality predicated on practitioners of that preference respecting core features of an EGI-based approach to society: heteronormalization, marriage for heterosexuals only, pro-natalism, respect for traditional family formation and values, as well as the usual interests in immigration control and racial preservation.

At this point, my fundamental viewpoint of minimal tolerance, as outlined at the beginning of this essay, and which existed before this Salter essay, remains, but with some important clarifications.

Thus, at this point, I would still maintain that homosexuals can play a role in the racial activism, providing:

1. They are not in the top leadership. They can be prominent members and important contributors, but not at the top of the hierarchy, as all of the various moral, social, ethical, etc. issues outlined by Salter and others come into play at the highest level.  

2. Homosexuals in the “movement” who are playing an important (albeit not top leadership roles, as stated above) need to be open about themselves and their preferences.  This will prevent blackmail and other pressure from the System/Left and avoid unpleasant “surprises” for the rank-and-file later on.

3. Most importantly, homosexuals in the “movement” should, as explained above, respect “key features of an EGI-based approach to society: heteronormalization, marriage for heterosexuals only, pro-natalism, respect for traditional family formation and values, as well as the usual interests in immigration control and racial preservation.”  They should not be pushing homosexual apologia, promoting homosexuality in general, defending gay marriage, or enabling and/or condoning homosexual harassment/pickups at pro-White meetings.

While the points above can allow for minimal tolerance, it does not seem like they have been followed.

In Part II, we will look at Andrew Joyce’s objections to tolerance and consider if the viewpoint I promote here needs to be adjusted based on Joyce’s arguments.