The NA question again.
I have previously written about the National Alliance (NA) and its long-time leader, the late Dr. William Pierce, and why that organization, widely recognized as the most successful (in relative terms) White racialist organization in post-WWII America, failed to achieve its major objectives and eventually collapsed (it today exists as a shadow of its former self, with Will Williams as its leader and Kevin Strom as its major ideologue). In addition to the post about the Headquarters question (below), some of my previous comments on this subject are here, also see here, also see this, and see this as well.
Given the importance of the NA in the history of the "movement," understanding its failures – that are essentially the failures of Pierce – can assist in developing more successful approaches that avoid the same pitfalls. Thus, this post can be viewed as a summary of my thoughts on this matter as of the present time (more may come in the future).
I divide the analysis into four components: Ideology, Strategy, Tactics, and Personality. I then end with Lessons.
Note that this analysis focuses on predominantly endogenous factors, not purely exogenous factors. Thus, I concentrate on characteristics and actions of Pierce and the NA, rather than external factors such as "the sociopolitical climate of America was such that there was no way for the NA to be successful." Of course, there is overlap between endogenous and exogenous factors; for example my assertion that the NA's ideology was unsuitable for America can be considered as much about America as the NA. However, in theory, the NA could have (should have is another question) adjusted components of its ideology; everything I criticize are things that are strongly associated with internal characteristics of Pierce and the NA, and could have been adjusted. My critiques are, therefore, in my opinion, fair since they involve issues that were within the power of Pierce and the NA to, at least to some extent, change. Even issues of personality fall into this category; for example, Pierce could have modified his leadership style to match his personality, even if he likely could not have significantly altered his basic personality type.
Ideology. While the NA was ostensibly a pro-White activist organization and, also, ostensibly, pan-European/pan-Aryan, in reality it was an overtly neo-Nazi, Hitler-worshipping, narrowly racial-biological (essentially ignoring culture), and solidly Nordicist. The NA was firmly in the camp of what Yockey termed “vertical racism” and was very radical in this sense and, again, as must be stressed, unapologetically “Nazi” (indeed, Pierce got his start in the "movement" as part of Rockwell’s American Nazi Party). This hardcore, radical neo-Nazism was, and is, not well suited for America, not only for the White masses (that Pierce was not really interested in appealing to), but also to most of the “elite” Whites that the NA wished to recruit. That Pierce and the NA were, at their heart, extremely Nordicist while pretending to be pan-European/pan-Aryan was a major weak point, another focus of tension leading to potential problems. When combined with Pierce’s strategic and tactical errors (and personality issues), the NA's flawed ideology doomed the group to inevitable failure, and in part explains why the organization degenerated into a Pierce personality cult.
Please note that I am not saying that the NA had to alter their underlying worldview to adjust to the surrounding society; after all, I am an opponent of mainstreaming (in the sense of changing core beliefs). But there is a difference between being national socialist (small "n" and small "s") and being overtly neo-Nazi with openly Nazi aesthetics and Hitler worship. There's a difference between stressing biological race and focusing exclusively on that. If Pierce wanted the NA to follow a Nordicist philosophy, then he should have restricted NA membership to "Germanic" NW Europeans ("Nordics") and not pretended to be pan-European/pan-Aryan. Of course, it is possible that even with those adjustments, the organization's ideology would still have been ill-suited for America. However, at least it would have eliminated superfluous harmful characteristics (e.g., cartoonish Nazi memes) as well as hypocrisy (the cryptic Nordicism). And, in any case, at this point in my analysis I am being more descriptive than prescriptive; my belief is that the NA's progress was inhibited by its ideology and how that ideology was manifested. If that was so, whether or not the organization should have changed its ideology (or at least the surface manifestations of that ideology), or just plowed ahead "as is," is another question.
Strategy. Although I am no fan of Greg Johnson, I will admit that Johnson’s characterization of Pierce as a “Leninist” has validity. Pierce’s strategy, such as it was, seemed to be to create a revolutionary cadre, and the paradigms of his novels The Turner Diaries and Hunter seem to underline what his mindset was concerning his preferred mechanism of social change. Thus, Pierce was interested in revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, change. The NA did not engage in electoral politics, was uninterested in real community building or in broad metapolitical education (other than their insipid propaganda and the books they sold), knew nothing about democratic multiculturalism, was not interested in the slow infiltration of institutions, and always seem to have the attitude of “the system is about to collapse, so…no need to do X,Y,Z.” There really didn’t seem to be any grand strategy at all apart from wishful thinking that somehow a revolutionary cadre will be built and somehow that will lead to the overthrow of the System. Year after year, decade after decade…and no progress to anything meaningful occurred, which is not really surprising since there was no realistic strategy directing the organization to achieving any fixed objectives. The combination of a flawed ideology and a missing or ineffective strategy doomed the group from accomplishing anything meaningful, even without the tactical and personality problems discussed below.
Tactics. I have previously discussed Pierce's error in moving the NA’s “National Office” to the mountain woods of West Virginia, see here. The costs and benefits of the move are considered in that essay and the conclusion is that the costs significantly outweighed the benefits. Thus, the decision to move to the mountains of West Virginia was a very serious tactical error.
Another serious error was the over-centralization of decision-making in the NA. True enough, keeping a tight control of NA local unit activity made some sense since the government, as well as litigious “watchdog” groups such as the SPLC, would have attempted to hold Pierce responsible for any illegal activities of his followers. But he went too far in smothering any and all local initiative (with a few possible exceptions – Gliebe in Ohio may have had a bit more of a free hand, I don’t know), and, in the end, many local units were allowed to do nothing except distribute the sterile and unappealing propaganda of the National Office. A combination of high quality, prudent and disciplined local unit coordinators, and a more “rapid response” and flexible national leadership, could have allowed local units to engage in a wider scope of (perfectly legal) activity, including producing and distributing locally-relevant propaganda. Not allowing greater local autonomy squandered many opportunities, depressed local unit morale, and basically transformed the National Alliance from a potentially useful activist organization into a money-making enterprise for Pierce. In the end, while one could understand why a degree of centralized control was necessary, Pierce went way overboard with this. Pierce could have tested local units by first allowing a small degree of local initiative to them and then observing the results; those units that proved capable of effective and responsible self-directed activity could have been kept on a longer leash, while others who proved not capable kept on a much shorter leash.
Thus, the combination of over-centralization and a non-dynamic, slow, and inflexible national leadership impeded progress to a significant degree. Associated with all of that is that the NA, particularly at the local unit level, had poor security, and was too easily compromised by infiltrators and spying. The habit of giving responsibility for local security to folks whose qualifications were, e.g., “an interest in Viking battle axes,” yielded the expected tragicomic results. Greater local unit autonomy would have been possible only with greater security and proper vetting of members, who all needed to be of high quality. Further related to this was Pierce's poor judgment in choosing (at least some) local unit coordinators, with a combination of typical "movement" ethnic affirmative action, combined with Tom Sawyer-like techniques – e.g., paint a fence at the national headquarters, and so prove you are uncomplaining enough to follow orders. That’s a bit limited for vetting I think. Obviously, greater local unit autonomy, and, overall, more productive local units, absolutely required local unit leadership of very high quality, and that did not seem to exist in some cases. And whomever was responsible for selecting Gliebe as Pierce’s successor made a terrible mistake. Gliebe may have been an effective local unit coordinator (I don’t know for sure, but he had that reputation), but he was not suited to lead the NA after Pierce's death.
Personality. A group like the NA, with a highly centralized command structure, and with an eventual personality cult, required a dynamic and charismatic leader. Pierce, whatever his positive attributes – after all he led the most successful (again, note “most” – relative terms) White racialist group for about three decades – lacked dynamism and charisma and was more of an intellectual introvert (albeit a highly radicalized one, with a “Leninist” temperament). By itself, this may not have been fatal, but when combined with the other problems, it was disastrous. Indeed, moving to the “mountaintop” in the West Virginia woods had more to do with Pierce’s personal preferences and temperament than to any deep strategic or tactical planning (and in Griffin’s biography of Pierce, there was talk of some personal reasons why Pierce left the DC area for West Virginia). Pierce’s lack of dynamism, flexible thinking, and timely decision-making was also a big problem for an organization that was so highly centralized and depended on his approval for getting things done, particularly at the local level. Months and years went by with nothing seemingly getting done other than distribution of mediocre propaganda, payment of “membership dues,” and book sales. For a “Leninist,” that’s no way to make a “revolution.”
Lessons. Looking at this from a positive, constructive sense, what is required is an ideology that is consistent for its members (if you have pan-European membership then be pan-European; if you are Nordicist, then restrict membership to Nordics), sane, appropriate for its society, not obsessed with Hitler and Nazism, and something that can be broadly applied to different strategies and tactics. It can indeed be very radical, but in a sense other than “Sieg Heil, praise Saint Adolf.” There needs to be an effective grand strategy that encompasses different synergistic approaches and not just a “Der Tag” revolutionary mindset, there needs to be appropriate tactics and a learning curve that avoids repeating error, there needs to be a balance between centralization and decentralization (while keeping legal liability in mind, maintaining discipline, and having effective operational security), and leaders need to have leadership personalities.
Labels: behold the movement, National Alliance, Old Movement, Pierce, strategy and tactics
